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PRETRIAL DETERMINATIONS OF PROBABLE
CAUSE TO DETAIN DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH
THE COMMISSION OF MISDEMEANORS
INTRODUCTION
In all criminal cases in California, both felony and misde-
meanor, the defendant must be arraigned within two days of
his arrest.' At the arraignment the defendant is informed of the
crime with which he has been charged, his right to counsel, and
he is asked to enter a plea.' From this point the procedure in
felony and misdemeanor cases diverges.
A major difference between felony and misdemeanor pro-
cedure is that by statute a defendant in a felony case is entitled
to a preliminary hearing and the misdemeanor defendant is
not.' California's statutory preliminary hearing is an adversary
proceeding in which the defendant is entitled to counsel and
during which both the prosecution and the defense may present
evidence.' After the evidence is presented the magistrate must
determine if there is sufficient evidence to "lead a man of ordi-
nary caution and prudence to believe, and conscientiously en-
tertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused."' If the
magistrate finds that there is probable cause to believe that the
defendant committed the crime with which he is charged the
defendant is held for trial in the superior court.' If the magis-
trate finds that the evidence is not sufficient to establish proba-
ble cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime
with which he has been charged the defendant must be dis-
charged7 and his bail must be exonerated.' Thus, it is possible
1. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 825, 829 (West 1970).
2. Id. § 859 (West Supp. 1976); id. § 988 (West 1970).
3. Id. § 859b (West Supp. 1976) reads in the pertinent part:
At the time the defendant appears before the magistrate for arraignment,
if the public offense is a felony to which the defendant has not pleaded
guilty in accordance with Section 859a, the magistrate, . . . must set a
time for the examination of the case and must allow not less than two
days, excluding Sundays and holidays, for the district attorney and the
defendant to prepare for the examination. . . .Unless the defendant
waives the right, the defendant if he is in custody shall have the right to
a preliminary examination within 10 court days of the date he is ar-
raigned or pleads, whichever occurs later.
4. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 859b, 860, 865, 866 (West
1970); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970).
5. People v. Nagle, 25 Cal. 2d 216, 222, 153 P.2d 344, 347 (1944).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 872 (West 1970).
7. Id. § 871 (West 1970).
8. Id. § 1303 (West Supp. 1976). This assumes that the charges are not refiled
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for a felony defendant to gain his release from all restraints
upon his liberty without going to trial.
Until recently, however, there has been no procedure by
which a defendant charged with the commission of a misde-
meanor could challenge the power of the court to impose re-
straints upon his liberty prior to trial. If a defendant was not
released on his own recognizance and if he was not able to raise
bail, he was entitled to a bail reduction hearing within five
days of arraignment, but that hearing could only be used to
challenge the amount of bail which he must post, not the legal
power of the court to require him to post it? Gerstein v. Pugh'"
and In re Walters" have altered this situation.
This comment explores the rationale and the scope of
Gerstein and Walters. It also explores the procedural require-
ments of a Gerstein hearing," the determinations made there,
the standards applied, and the strengths and weaknesses of the
procedure.
THE GERSTEIN DECISION
The United States Supreme Court held in Gerstein v.
Pugh that Florida's failure to grant defendants a preliminary
hearing deprived them of a significant right under the fourth
amendment. '3
as is possible under the decisions in People v. Uhlemann, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 664, 511 P.2d
609, 610, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657, 658 (1973); People v. Prewitt, 52 Cal. 2d 330, 340, 341 P.2d
1, 6 (1959); Ex parte Fenton, 77 Cal. 183, 184, 19 P. 267, 267-68 (1888).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320 (West Supp. 1976). Under CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275
(West 1970), the grounds for deciding the amount of bail, if any, which the defendant
should be required to post relate to the gravity of the crime, the defendant's criminal
history and the likelihood that the defendant will make the required appearances.
None of these factors considers the question of the existence of probable cause to
believe that the defendant has committed a crime.
10. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
11. 15 Cal. 3d 738, 543 P.2d 607, 126 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1975).
12. In this comment a request for the hearing required by this case is called a
Gerstein motion and the hearing itself a Gerstein hearing.
13. Respondents Pugh and Henderson were being held in custody prior to trial.
Mr. Pugh was not eligible for bail because he was charged with an offense, robbery,
which carried a life sentence. FLA. STATS. ANN. §§ 812.13, 903.03 (West 1976). Mr.
Henderson was unable to raise enough money to post bail. They requested a prelimi-
nary hearing, but were denied one under the existing Florida case law. See, e.g., Hardy
v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972). Respondents then filed a class action suit in
federal district court claiming a constitutional right to a judicial determination of
probable cause. 420 U.S. at 105-07.
For the decisions of the lower courts see Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107
(S.D. Fla. 1971), enforced, 355 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 483 F.2d 778 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nor. Gerstein v. Pugh, 414 U.S. 1062 (1973).
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The Court found that the case raised two important issues:
"[W]hether a person arrested and held for trial on an informa-
tion is entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for
detention, and if so, whether the adversary hearing ordered by
the District Court and approved by the Court of Appeals is
required by the Constitution."' 4
Three factors were considered important in determining
whether there was a constitutional right to a pretrial judicial
determination of probable cause to detain. First, since the de-
fendant is in custody at the time of the hearing, allowing him
a pretrial determination of probable cause can in no way en-
danger society. 5 Second, the Court noted that a person charged
with the commission of a crime can be held in custody prior to
trial or can be subjected to onerous limits on an own recogniz-
ance release.'" The Court believed that either restriction can
affect a person's liberty. The loss of a job, the loss of income,
and deterioration in the suspect's familial relationships can
flow from both detention and limited OR release. 7 Third,
Gerstein found the history of English and American criminal
procedure persuasive.'" It noted that at common law in Eng-
land the suspect was customarily brought before a justice of the
peace shortly after arrest for a determination of probable cause
to believe that the defendant had committed a crime.'" It also
For commentaries on the decisions of the district court and the Fifth Circuit, see
60 VA. L. REV. 540 (1974); 25 VAND. L. REV. 434 (1972).
14. 420 U.S. at 111.
15. Id. at 114.
16. Id. As examples of what the Gerstein Court felt were onerous limits upon a
defendant's liberty it cited 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(a)(2), (5) (1970). Under section
3146(a)(2), a federal court can "place restrictions on the travel, association, or place
of abode" of a person who is released on his own recognizance. Under section 3146
(a)(5), a federal district court can require a person who is released on his own recogniz-
ance to return to custody each day at certain hours.
17. 420 U.S. at 114. For the adverse effect of pretrial detention on plea
bargaining, see, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
AND GOALS: CORRECTIONS 168-69 (1973); Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 641 (1964); Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statisti-
cal Study, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631 (1964).
For a description of the conditions under which a defendant is detained in the
county jail prior to trial see, e.g., BOARD OF CORRECTIONS, CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL
SYSTEM STUDY, JAIL TASK FORCE REPORT 39-40, 72 (1971); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
CORRECTIONS 24-25 (1967); Pre-Trial Detention in the New York City Jails, 7 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 350 (1971); Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of
Pretrial Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941, 941-47 (1970).
18. 420 U.S. at 114-16.
19. Id. at 114-15. In support, the Court cited 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
583-86(1736); 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W. HAWKINS,
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noted that in the United States, after the adoption of the fourth
amendment, probable cause decisions were subject to review
on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 0 From these observa-
tions the Court concluded that a defendant who is subject to
pretrial detention is suffering a restraint upon his liberty, and,
thus, under the fourth amendment he has a right to a judicial
determination of probable cause to believe that he committed
the crime with which he has been charged.
The Gerstein Court next considered the appropriate scope
of the hearing to determine probable cause."' While the Court
realized that an adversary hearing would result in a more relia-
ble determination of probable cause than would a nonadver-
sary hearing,22 it listed four factors which militated against
requiring a full adversary hearing. First, the Court noted that
the question for decision at the hearing will be limited to a
determination of the existence of probable cause to detain the
defendant prior to trial.2" Second, it noted that the determina-
tion to be made at the hearing does not require a fine balancing
of the evidence. Third, the suspect's defense on the merits
would not be jeopardized by a nonadversarial hearing. Since
the defendant need not be given an opportunity to cross-
examine prosecution witnesses, the testimony presented would
not be admissible at trial as an exception to the hearsay rule
for former testimony." Fourth, the Court saw an adversary
hearing as a further burden on already overcrowded courts.,
The Gerstein Court therefore concluded that it is not necessary
under the fourth amendment to provide the defendant with a
full adversary hearing.27
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 112-19 (4th ed. 1762); J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 233 (1833).
20. 420 U.S. at 115-16. In support, the Court cited Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307, 317-20 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 498-
99 (1885); Ex parte Bollman 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 97-101 (1807); Ex parte Burford, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806); United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795).
21. The decisions of the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
required that the suspect be given an adversary hearing. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d
778, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1973); Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107, 1112-15 (S.D. Fla.
1971).
22. 420 U.S. at 121-22.
23. Id. at 120-21.
24. Id. at 121, 123. See text accompanying notes 67-69 infra, for an explanation
of the scope of the decision to be made at a Gerstein hearing.
25. 420 U.S. at 122-23. Under California v. Green, 399 U.S. 49 (1970), for former
testimony to be admissible in a later criminal trial the defendant must be afforded an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
26. 420 U.S. at 122 n.23.
27. Id. at 123. For criticism of these arguments see Winter, Probable Cause for
[Vol. 17
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Thus Gerstein established that defendants who are sub-
jected to pretrial restraints upon their liberty have a right to a
nonadversary determination of probable cause by a neutral and
detached magistrate. 8 In so holding the Court did not attempt
to establish a precise procedure for the hearing. Instead, it
established a set of minimum requirements which it felt were
constitutionally compelled, but left to the states the determi-
nation of the form that the hearing would actually take. "
PROBABLE CAUSE HEARINGS FOR MISDEMEANANTS
In In re Walters the California Supreme Court considered
the impact of Gerstein on California criminal procedure. It held
that, under the rationale of Gerstein, misdemeanor defendants
are constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of
probable cause to detain.'
Walters was arraigned on misdemeanor charges and his
attorney demanded a Gerstein hearing." On the basis of the
Pretrial Detention: Does Gerstein v. Pugh Adequately Insure Its Existence, 6 GOLDEN
GATE L. REV. 139 (1975); Note, A Constitutional Right to A Preliminary Hearing for
All Pretrial Detainees, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 158 (1974); Case Comment, Pretrial Detai-
nees Have a Fourth Amendment Right to a Judicial Determination of Probable Cause,
10 VAL. L. REV. 199 (1975); 37 OHIo ST. L.J. 170 (1976); 51 WASH. L. REv. 425 (1976).
While the Gerstein Court noted that pretrial custody could impair the ability of
the suspect to aid in the preparation of his defense, it did not give enough weight to
this factor. 420 U.S. at 123. The Court should have given more weight to this factor
due to the gravity of the results of a felony conviction.
28. 420 U.S. at 124-25. An analogous procedure has been available to prisoners
who are being held on federal charges under FED. R. CRIM. P. 5, 5.1 and the United
States Supreme Court decisions in the cases of Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214,
218 (1965); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453-54 (1957); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 342-44 (1943).
29. 420 U.S. at 123-25. Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall ob-
jected to specifying procedural protections which are not required by the fourth
amendment. Id. at 126-27 (Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall J.J., concurring).
It should be noted that the Gerstein Court left it to the states to decide the type
of hearing which would be given to a person who makes a Gerstein motion. Id. at 123-
25. This follows a trend which the United States Supreme Court has established in
recent years. The Court has been expanding the scope of the due process clause to cover
areas in which due process rights did not previously exist. In doing so the Court has
established general guidelines as to the content of the hearings to be provided, but it
has left it to the states to establish procedures for the hearing. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975) (suspension from school); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)
(revocation of probation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation of
parole).
30. 15 Cal. 3d 738, 747, 543 P.2d 607, 614, 126 Cal. Rptr. 239, 246 (1975).
31. Id. at 743, 543 P.2d at 611, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 243. Mr. Walters was arrested
for possession of marijuana in violation of CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West
1975) and being intoxicated in public in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(f) (West
1970).
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police reports, the magistrate held that there was probable
cause to detain Walters prior to trial.32 Walters filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in order to challenge the magis-
trate's determination of probable cause.33 He claimed that his
rights under the fourth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution, and under Article I, sections 7 and 13, of the Califor-
nia Constitution, had been violated because the hearing was
inadequate.3" Despite the fact that Walters was no longer in
pretrial custody and that the issue, therefore, was technically
moot, the court ruled on the merits of the issues presented by
the petition, because the case raised an issue "of general public
concern . . .in the area of the supervision of the administra-
tion of criminal justice."35
The Walters court noted that while the United States Su-
preme Court in Gerstein did not address the issue,3" the ration-
ale of the Gerstein decision applied equally to misdemeanor
defendants and felony defendants, and held that Gerstein hear-
ings must be made available both to defendants charged with
the commission of a felony and to defendants charged with the
commission of a misdemeanor.37
The court noted that current procedure in felony cases is
in compliance with the requirements of Gerstein.3" If a defen-
dant charged by information with the commission of a felony
makes a Gerstein motion in superior court, the magistrate need
only establish that the defendant was given a preliminary hear-
ing and that at that hearing the defendant was held to answer
32. Id. at 743, 543 P.2d at 611, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
33. Id. at 742, 543 P.2d at 611, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 744, 543 P.2d at 612, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 244. Only one other court has
taken this position. State ex rel. Joshua, 327 So. 2d 429 (La. Ct. App. 1976). In that
case it was held that a juvenile had a right to a preliminary hearing. No other state
court has ignored the issue of mootness. See, e.g., Brown v. State, - Ark. -, 534
S.W.2d 213, 217 (1976); McClure v. Hooper, 234 Ga. 45, 47, 214 S.E.2d 503, 505 (1975);
State v. Lass, 228 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Iowa 1975); People v. Shing, 83 Misc. 2d 213,.._,
371 N.Y.S.2d 322, 328 (1975).
36. The decisions of the district court and the Fifth Circuit held that preliminary
hearings must be provided for suspects charged with the commission of felonies or
misdemeanors. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1973); Pugh v. Rain-
water, 332 F. Supp. 1107, 1112-15 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
37. 15 Cal. 3d at 748-49, 543 P.2d at 615, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 247. The court stated:
"These circumstances present precisely that situation with which Gerstein was con-
cerned: a significant pretrial restraint of liberty without procedures for a reliable deter-
mination of probable cause for that restraint. Clearly petitioner was entitled to de-
mand such determination when he first appeared before the magistrate." Id.
38. Id. at 752 n.8, 543 P.2d 617-18 n.8, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 249-50 n.8.
[Vol. 17
PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING
by the magistrate.39
Defendants held pursuant to an indictment issued by a
grand jury presented a more difficult problem. Walters noted
that a defendant who is indicted is not given a judicial determi-
nation of probable cause.'" However, the grand jury's determi-
nation of probable cause, combined with the defendant's op-
portunity to bring a motion to set aside the indictment pur-
suant to Penal Code § 995, provides an adequate opportunity
to litigate the question of the existence of probable cause to de-
tain prior to trial." The Walters court added that if a defend-
ant who is indicted by the grand jury fails to avail himself of
this procedure, it will be assumed that he has waived his right
to a Gerstein hearing.2 Thus, Gerstein and Walters will have
no effect on the California procedure in felony cases.
The major impact in California of Gerstein and Walters
will be on misdemeanor procedures. The Walters court noted
that the Gerstein determination of probable cause to detain
could be made either before or after the defendant's arrest43 and
that the standard to be applied in determining the existence
of probable cause to detain is identical to the standard which
is used in determining probable cause to issue an arrest war-
rant." Thus, Gerstein does not require a post-arrest determina-
tion of probable cause to detain if the defendant was arrested
pursuant to an arrest warrant.
39. Id. For the standard to be applied in determining whether there is probable
cause to hold the defendant to answer see Garabedian v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d
124, 378 P.2d 590, 28 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963).
The Walters court did not specify the proper procedure if the defendant waived
the preliminary hearing as is allowed by CAL. PENAL CODE § 860 (West 1970).
40. 15 Cal. 3d at 752 n.8, 543 P.2d at 617-18 n.8, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 249-50 n.8.
41. Id. CAL. PENAL CODE § 995 (West 1970) reads in pertinent part:
The indictment or information must be set aside by the court in which
the defendant is arraigned, upon his motion, in either of the following
cases:
If it be an indictment:
1. Where it is not found, endorsed, and presented as prescribed in
this code.
2. That the defendant has been indicted without reasonable or
probable cause.
For'a discussion of the related problem of a right to a post-indictment preliminary
hearing see Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 742, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32
(1975); Comment, Post-Indictment Preliminary Hearings?, 9 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC.
& PRO. 499 (1975-76).
42. 15 Cal. 3d at 752 n.8, 543 P.2d at 617-18 n.8, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 249-50 n.8.
43. Id. at 749, 543 P.2d at 615, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 247, citing Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 124-25 (1975).
44. Id.
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The California Supreme Court in Walters, however, held
that a post-arrest judicial determination of probable cause was
necessary regardless of whether the arrest was made pursuant
to a warrant. The court relied on two factors. First, without a
post-arrest hearing a conclusive presumption of validity would
be given to an arrest warrant, even if the warrant was issued
on the basis of an affidavit which is factually or technically
deficient. 5 If the defendant is given a post-arrest hearing his
attorney can bring to the Court's attention any deficiency in
the arrest warrant. If it is deficient, and if the prosecution
cannot present other evidence sufficient to establish probable
cause to detain, the defendant will be entitled to be released
from detention. Second, the only other way in which probable
cause to detain could be challenged is by filing a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, which imposes a large burden on both
the defendant and the prosecution." Thus, the Walters court
concluded that Gerstein hearings should be available to defen-
dants charged with the commission of misdemeanors whether
or not an arrest warrant has been issued. 7
In Gerstein the United States Supreme Court held that
before a person is entitled to a determination of probable cause
to detain he must be subject to a "significant restraint" upon
his liberty.4" The Walters court interpreted that language to
mean that if the defendant is released on his own recognizance
or after posting bail he would not be entitled to a Gerstein
hearing. 9 The effect of Walters is that a defendant charged
with committing a misdemeanor will be entitled to a Gerstein
hearing only if he is in custody due to an inability to post bail.
Gerstein and Walters attempt to protect interests in lib-
erty that are less compelling if the defendant has been released
45. Id. at 748-49, 543 P.2d at 615-16, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48.
46. Id. at 749 n.5, 543 P.2d at 615-16 n.5, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48 n.5.
47. Id. at 750, 543 P.2d at 616, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
48. 420 U.S. at 125. The Gerstein Court did not define what was meant by this
requirement. The only guidance which the Court gave was to state that a promise to
appear is not a significant restraint upon the defendant's liberty and that the require-
ments of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(a)(2), (5) (1970) were significant restraints. 420 U.S. at
114.
49. 15 Cal. 3d at 743 & n.1, 543 P.2d at 611 & n.1, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 243 & n.1.
To date only one other court has considered the merits of this issue. In In re Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 309 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1975) the Florida Supreme Court
held that all defendants who are detained prior to trial and those defendants who are
released on conditions which they can show to be significant restraints upon their
liberty are entitled to determinations of probable cause to detain. Id. at 544-45. See 3
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 650 (1975).
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on his own recognizance or after posting bail. The adverse ef-
fects of an arrest will be minimized if the defendant is released
soon after arrest because it is less likely that he will lose his job
or income or that his familial relationships will be seriously
impaired.
The Walters court held that Gerstein was applicable to
misdemeanor defendants as well as felony defendants and
whether or not he has been arrested pursuant to a warrant. The
result is that all misdemeanor defendants in California who
are subject to pretrial detention will receive pretrial determina-
tions of probable cause.
THE SCOPE OF THE HEARING
Walters established that a person who is charged with the
commission of a misdemeanor and who is subject to a
"significant restraint" upon his liberty is entitled to a Gerstein
hearing, but the hearing that he is entitled to is less than a full
adversarial hearing. It is subject to a number of rigid limita-
tions.
The initial burden is on the defendant in that he must
make a Gerstein motion at the time of his arraignment or he,
in effect, will waive his right to a pretrial determination of
probable cause to detain him, unless he can prove that he did
not have notice of his right.5"
Once the defendant makes a Gerstein motion he must be
granted a hearing to determine whether there is sufficient evi-
dence to establish probable cause to believe that the defendant
committed the crime with which he has been charged.5 This
standard is identical to the standard which is applied at the
preliminary hearing to determine if a felony defendant should
be held to answer in the superior court.52 However, the struc-
ture of a Gerstein hearing and the preliminary hearing received
by a felony defendant will differ radically due to the nonadver-
sary nature of a Gerstein hearing and the nature of the evidence
50. 15 Cal. 3d at 750, 573 P.2d at 616, 126 Cal. :Rptr. at 248.
51. 420 U.S. at 111; 15 Cal. 3d at 753, 543 P.2d at 618, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
This standard is identical to the standard which a magistrate applies in determining
whether there is probable cause to issue an arrest warrant. See, e.g., Jaben v. United
States, 381 U.S. 214 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949);
People v. Cressey, 2 Cal. 3d 836, 471 P.2d 19, 87 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1970); People v.
Sesslin, 68 Cal. 2d 418, 439 P.2d 321, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1968).
52. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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which the magistrate can consider at that hearing. Unlike the
statutory preliminary hearing the defendant has no right to
present evidence at a Gerstein hearing and he need not be given
an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses presented by the
prosecution. 3 The Walters court stated: "[A]s the defendant
is not entitled to challenge such factual statements by con-
fronting and cross-examining the declarer [sic], he likewise
has no right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who
testify on the issue of probable cause to detain."54 All of the
evidence will be presented by the prosecution, and except for
the defendant's presence with his attorney, the hearing has all
of the attributes of an ex parte hearing.
The nature of the evidence upon which the magistrate will
make a determination as to the existence of probable cause to
detain will also have a large effect upon the type of hearing
which will be provided to a person who has made a Gerstein
motion. Under Walters the magistrate is to consider the same
type of evidence as he would in a hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause to issue an arrest warrant.55 The
magistrate can consider an arrest warrant and its supporting
complaint and affidavit,5" police reports of the incident,57 or a
sworn complaint which fully explains the facts of the case and
establishes all of the elements of the offense.58 If none of these
documents is sufficient to establish probable cause, the prose-
cution may present and the magistrate can consider testimo-
nial evidence. 9
The court recognized that some evidence would be hear-
say"0 and in order to insure that the evidence which is received
is reliable, it held that the information must be part of a sworn
document which is based upon the personal knowledge of the
affiant8 ' or "[ulpon the belief of such person who further
states the basis for his information and belief and other facts
53. 15 Cal. 3d at 752-53, 543 P.2d at 618, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
54. Id.
55. For the types of information which are used in determinations of probable
cause to issue an arrest warrant See generally Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,
412-19 (1969); Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 221-25 (1965); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 484-87 (1958);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-78 (1949).
56. 15 Cal. 3d at 751, 543 P.2d at 616, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
57. Id. at 751, 543 P.2d at 617, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
58. Id. at 752, 543 P.2d at 617, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
59. Id. at 752-53, 543 P.2d at 618, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
60. Id. at 751, 543 P.2d at 617, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
61. Id.
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which demonstrate the trustworthiness of such information.""2
Thus, the main inquiry in a Gerstein hearing will be to deter-
mine whether the papers presented by the prosecution show the
elements of the crime and whether the person who provided the
information is credible. In most cases the determination of
probable cause to detain will be made after the magistrate
reads a copy of a sworn complaint and a police report or, if
there is an arrest warrant, the complaint and the affidavit
which were prepared to support the request for the issuance of
the arrest warrant.
In order to give guidance to the lower courts, the California
Supreme Court noted several situations which it felt did not
establish probable cause to detain. The magistrate should rule
that there is no probable cause to detain if the documents
which the prosecutor submits merely recite the defendant's
crime in the language of the statute; 3 or if there is no statement
in the charging documents to show that the information con-
tained therein is based upon the personal knowledge of the
affiant;14 or if there is not a sufficient basis to show that the
information contained in the documents which are presented
upon the information and belief, is trustworthy. 5
After receiving the evidence, the magistrate will evaluate
it in order to determine if there are "facts and circumstances
'sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the
[suspect] had committed . . . an offense.' "66 If the magistrate
finds that there is not probable cause to believe that the defen-
dant committed the crime with which he has been charged, the
defendant must be released from pretrial custody. If, however,
the prosecution can establish probable cause to believe that the
defendant committed the crime with which he has been
charged, the defendant can be subjected to continued pretrial
detention if he is unable to post bail.68
Unlike the determination which is made in a preliminary
hearing in a felony prosecution, the determination of the exist-
62. Id.
63. Id. at 748, 543 P.2d at 615, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 751, 543 P.2d at 617, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
66. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 111.
67. 15 Cal. 3d at 753, 543 P.2d at 618, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
68. Id. Under California law all persons charged with the commission of misde-
meanors have a right to bail. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 12; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1270,
1271 (West 1970); In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 508 P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1973).
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ence of probable cause to detain pursuant to a Gerstein hearing
will have no effect on the power of the district attorney to
prosecute the case, since the Walters court held that the hear-
ing is solely concerned with the loss of liberty prior to trial. 9
Therefore, the real effect of Gerstein and Walters will be to
allow defendants who could not afford bail to be released solely
on their promise to appear if the prosecutor cannot convince
the magistrate that there is probable cause to detain.
DEFICIENCIES IN THE HEARING PROCEDURES
There are two major deficiencies in the procedure estab-
lished by Walters. First, the Gerstein hearing is too summary
and too heavily weighted in favor of the prosecution. The evi-
dence upon which the magistrate will make his determination
of probable cause will be, in most cases, the police report of the
incident. This report is likely to be one-sided and in some cases
it will contain factual misstatements. The defendant does not
have a right to present evidence in his own behalf or even to
cross-examine live witnesses presented by the prosecution.
Thus, the defendant will not have an opportunity to challenge
even the most outrageous factual misstatements contained in
the information presented by the prosecutor. Further, the eval-
uation which the magistrate is to make is very superficial. The
magistrate will merely inspect the police report to see that it
recites the elements of the defendant's crime and that there
exist some indicium of the reliability of the information con-
tained in the report. Thus, it is apparent that in the normal
case the issue which will be litigated at a Gerstein hearing is
whether the police officer who arrested the defendant wrote a
report which satisfies the requirements of the Walters decision
and not whether there is a sufficient suspicion of guilt so as to
justify the imposition of restraints upon the defendant's lib-
erty.
There are four factors to which the Walters court should
have given more consideration and which militate toward giv-
ing the defendant a fuller hearing. First, until the defendant is
convicted he is entitled to the benefits of the presumption of
innocence and a fuller Gerstein hearing would insure that the
defendant would not be subjected to any of the incidents of a
conviction, such as imprisonment, until he is convicted.
69. 15 Cal. 3d at 753, 543 P.2d at 618-19, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 250-51.
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Second, decisions in the area of revocation of probation
and parole indicate that due process requires more than such
a minimal hearing. Both the United States and California Su-
preme Courts require that the defendant be afforded two hear-
ings before parole or probation revocation.10 The first hearing
is analogous to a preliminary hearing. The issue to be decided
at this hearing is whether there is probable cause to believe
that the defendant has violated a condition of his probation or
parole.7' The defendant may appear on his own behalf at this
hearing; he may present documents, letters, affidavits and wit-
nesses; and he may cross-examine adverse witnesses.72 At the
second hearing, called a final revocation hearing, the defendant
is entitled to a final determination of contested facts.73 The
procedure in probation and parole revocations is analogous to
the procedure in misdemeanor cases where the defendant gets
a Gerstein hearing and a trial. Despite the fact that the proce-
dure is similar, the suspected probation or parole violator's
rights are more fully protected than those of a defendant
charged with the commission of a misdemeanor because the
former is given an adversarial preliminary hearing. This result
is anomalous because both the revocation procedures and the
Gerstein hearing are attempting to ensure that the defendant
is not subjected to restraints upon his liberty on the basis of
unfounded charges and while the defendant charged with the
commission of a misdemeanor may be deprived of all of his
liberty, a person suspected of violating probation or parole is
being deprived of what the United States Supreme Court
called a conditional form of liberty.7" By this the Court meant
that a suspected probation or parole violator is already subject
to restrictions which are placed upon his freedom by the proba-
tion or parole department.75 There is no apparent justification
for providing a suspected misdemeanant with less protection
than is afforded a suspected probation or parole violator.
70. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 485-89 (1972); People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d 451, 458, 503 P.2d 1313, 1318-19, 105
Cal. Rptr. 305, 310-11 (1972).
71. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 485; accord People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d at
456-57, 503 P.2d at 1317-18, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10.
72. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 487; People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d at 456-57,
503 P.2d at 1317, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 309. See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975),
where the Court held that a student who is suspended from school must be allowed to
present his side before the suspension can become effective.
73. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 488.
74. Id. at 482.
75. Id.
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Third, if the magistrate determines that there is probable
cause to detain the defendant and he cannot raise bail, he can
be held in the county jail for up to thirty days before he must
be brought to trial.7" While the defendant is in custody he is
deprived of his constitutionally protected interest in liberty.
Liberty is a significant personal interest which is inadequately
protected by a hearing which is a mere formality. Giving the
defendant an opportunity to participate at the Gerstein hear-
ing would further safeguard that liberty interest without signif-
icantly encroaching on any legitimate state interest.
Finally, since, as the Walters court noted, under California
law the defendant is entitled to counsel at arraignment," at
which time the Gerstein hearing is to be held, his defense on
the merits would not be jeopardized if he were allowed to par-
ticipate in that hearing. The defendant's attorney would, as in
the constitutionally permitted statutory preliminary hearing,78
ensure that the defendant's case on the merits would not be
jeopardized. Thus, under current California criminal procedure
the defendant's rights would be fully protected if he were al-
lowed to participate in his Gerstein hearing.
The most persuasive argument against a full adversarial
Gerstein hearing is that it would result in an undue consump-
tion of the magistrate's time. Although efficient administration
of justice is an important state interest, it is outweighed in
these circumstances by the defendant's interest in his liberty.
Thus, the defendant should at least be offered the opportunity
to present exculpatory evidence or to cross-examine witnesses
presented by the prosecution.
The second deficiency in the procedure which was estab-
lished by the Walters decision is that the defendant is not
automatically provided with a Gerstein hearing. Given a
Gerstein hearing which is cursory in nature, the protection of
an automatic hearing is necessary to ensure that the defendant
is not arbitrarily deprived of his liberty. The consumption of
the magistrate's time would be minimal. Additionally, the de-
terminations of probable cause which are provided for defen-
dants who are charged with violating parole or probation are
automatically provided to the defendant.7 There is no mean-
76. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382(3) (West 1970).
77. 15 Cal. 3d 738, 750, 543 P.2d 607, 616, 126 Cal. Rptr. 239, 248.
78. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970).
79. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1972); People v. Vickers, 8 Cal.
3d 451, 460, 503 P.2d 1313, 1320, 105 Cal. Rptr. 305, 312 (1972).
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ingful distinction between parole or probation revocations and
misdemeanor prosecutions which would account for the lack of
an automatic hearing in the latter situation."0 This would be a
small change, but it would ensure that the defendant's liberty
would be protected from any unfounded restraints. The excess
consumption of time which would result is a small price to pay
in light of the benefits which the defendant could gain as a
result of a favorable decision in a Gerstein hearing.
CONCLUSION
The right to a pretrial determination of probable cause to
detain in misdemeanor cases which has been established in
Gerstein v. Pugh and In re Walters has remedied a deficiency
in pretrial procedure in California. In the past, a person ac-
cused of committing a misdemeanor who could not make bail,
could be incarcerated prior to trial without the slightest show-
ing of the defendant's involvement in criminal activity. As was
noted by the Gerstein and Walters courts, such incarceration
has serious effects on the defendant.
Gerstein and Walters have provided an important first
step by recognizing that defendants who are detained prior to
trial have rights which need protecting. Unless further steps are
taken, however, the rights with which Gerstein and Walters
were concerned will be destroyed by the very procedures which
were established to protect them.
Steven J. Alpers
80. The Walters court, citing Gerstein distinguished probation and parole revo-
cations from Gerstein hearings in three ways. First, it noted that one of the purposes
of a prerevocation hearing is to gather live testimony. Second, it noted that prosecutors
are not supposed to file misdemeanor charges unless they believe that there is probable
cause. Third, it noted that courts are overburdened. 15 Cal. 3d at 753 n.9, 543 P.2d
618 n.9, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 250 n.9.
None of these factors is persuasive. First, the Walters court could have required
that any testimony be preserved. Second, the reason for a Gerstein hearing is to impose
the judgment of a detached magistrate upon the process. Third, it would not consume
a large amount of time to allow the defendant to cross-examine witnesses or to present
the evidence which he has gathered by the time of the arraignment.
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